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Abstract— Globalization implies geographically dispersed supply chains composed of facilities 
strategically located in several countries and regions of the world. These structures commonly 
involve several Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) infrastructures 
and integration to enable accurate and useful information processing. Such integration (also called 
Cyber-Physical Systems) transforms the industry and facilitates massive data volumes' systematic 
transformation into valuable information. Security risks posed by such integration may be 
substantial and, depending on the size of the company, and the number of integration points, 
dealing with them could easily cost millions of dollars. With the main objective of studying 
available strategies to manage security risks in companies with dispersed supply chains, this paper 
reviews international cyber-security standards and regulations and proposes a more 
comprehensive strategy. The strategy includes IT services, optimized perimeter segregation, and 
data flow policies among OT and IT networks to balance a high level of protection and cost-
effectiveness.   
Keywords—Cyber-Physical Systems, Cyber Security Strategy, Internationally Dispersed Supply 
Chains 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The advent of Industry 4.0 instigated a series of digital transformation programs in companies [1] that 
undoubtedly results in a high level of processes integration into manufacturing, products, and services. 
Such networks integration of physical and computational components, also called Cyber-Physical 
Systems (CPS) [2], is transforming the industry. It facilitates the systematic transformation of massive 
data volumes into valuable information, which allows identification of visible patterns of degradations 
and inefficiencies, which, in turn, yields to optimal decision-making [3].  CPS also promotes autonomy, 
reliability, and control without human participation by combining technology and knowledge [4].  
A CPS architecture may consist of multiple static/mobile sensors and actuators networks integrated 
under an intelligent decision system [4]. CPS's essential enabler integrates several Operational 
Technology (OT) network segments starting at the shop floor up to high-level networks traditionally 
managed by Information Technology (IT) teams.   
Continuous improvements in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are increasing 
connectivity in all industries. On the other hand, advances in Industrial IoT (IIoT) and OT technologies 
provide the foundation of interconnecting CPS to the world of the Internet.  
In the past, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) from OT were implemented using non-routable networks 
(also called serial networks) that were born with the concept of islands of technology insolated in small 
subsystems responsible for the partial control of the production process. At that time, security was not a 
concern. OT networks (or Industrial Networks) were commonly isolated and, to perform an attack, an 
attacker would have to gain physical access to the network, which reduced the risk of cyber-attacks.  
In recent years, the situation has changed completely. There has been a shift from systems based 
around the interconnection of physical components (e.g. [5], [6],[7]) migrating to the TCP (Transmission 
Control Protocol)/IP (Internet Protocol) / Ethernet-based networks that offer better real-time monitoring 
 
and security services [8]. In CPS scenarios, however, TCP/IP / Ethernet networks and full integration, 
cybersecurity risks increase substantially [9], with the increased volume and pervasiveness of data that 
generate potential vulnerabilities [10]. 
Cyber-physical attacks have become a global issue for the nation's economy [11]. Organizations and 
governments have experienced cyber-security incidents that exfiltrate confidential or proprietary data, 
alter information to cause unexpected or unwanted effects, and harm capital assets [10] with substantial 
financial impacts [13]. This situation has attracted attention during the last years that emerged discussions 
regarding which is the best way to integrate CPS, e.g. [16], [15] and [19], including international cyber-
security standards and regulations.  
Dispersed supply chain structures imply production chains and facilities distributed in different 
locations [14], including several CPS, OT networks, and integrations points [15]. This situation increases 
the security vulnerabilities like in network equipment and IT services, which, in turn, requires additional 
cyber-security infrastructure, such as firewalls and DMZs (Demilitarized Zones), used for adding an extra 
layer of protection to the network [16]. Depending on the company's size and the number of integration 
points, the costs to deploy such infrastructures could easily reach millions of dollars.  
There are international cyber-security standards and regulations that organizations may use as an 
excellent source of knowledge to improve their cybersecurity capabilities [24;25;26;27;28;29;30]. 
However, they do not specifically address the trade-off between cyber-security effectiveness and costs in 
the dispersed supply chain context. In organizations, the cost is an important variable that needs to be 
considered and naturally balanced with related risks.  
This work's main objective is to propose a cyber-security strategy for companies with Internationally-
dispersed supply chains based on international standards and regulations that encompasses a high level of 
cyber-security and cost-effectiveness.  
II. C
HALLENGES OF INTERNATIONALLY-DISPERSED SUPPLY CHAINS  
 
Globalization and international trade imply geographically dispersed supply chains composed of 
production and facilities strategically located in several countries and regions of the world [14]. 
Company facilities may support different business capabilities with diverse CPS and IT services. 
Business capability (BC) is the notion used to describe an enterprise's essential functions [17]. These 
dispersed and diverse structures commonly involve several OT/IT infrastructures and integration to 
enable accurate and effective information processing [15]. 
Typically, each BC has its facilities, CPS, and work process as an independent subsystem inside the 
enterprise, even if geographically close to other BCs. In this scenario, horizontal integration (among BCs) 
of networks is not common. However, to maximize opportunities to identify correlated information useful 
for business needs, vertical integration is essential for data processing and analysis in an integrated way1 
[18], as shown in Figure 1.   
 
1 Nevertheless, this does not exclude the possibility of data being processed locally; sometimes local processing is necessary due to real-time requirements 
or latency restrictions. 
 
 
Fig. 1. A dispersed supply chain with different business capabilities 
 
The main challenges posed by the industrial network (vertical) integration of diverse supply chains 
with multiple BCs distributed across different locations are (i) how to reach the desired level of 
integration without compromising different aspects of cyber-security and (ii) how to balance the levels of 
security, integration in a non-prohibit costs scenario. 
III. O
T NETWORKS AND VULNERABILITIES  
 
An OT network is an interconnection system of devices used to monitor and control physical 
equipment in a cyber-physical system [19]. OT networks are most typically composed of several distinct 
areas, which can be simplified (based on ISA 952 [20]) in four network layers [21]: (1) Process and 
control networks, (2)   Supervisory networks, (3) Business operations networks and (4) Business 
networks (enterprise), as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 




Fig. 2. Network Layers adapted from ISA 95 [34] 
 
The essential difference between OT (layers 1 to 3) and enterprise networks (layer 4) is that OT 
networks are connected to physical equipment and are used to control and monitor real-world actions 
(generally in real-time) and conditions usually in a SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
environment. Enterprise Networks, in turn, is connected to the Internet to support corporative IT systems. 
As a result, OT networks have different considerations like service quality, determinism, and real-time 
data transfers that generally need robust architectures [19]. 
Industrial networks are mainly used in the direct operation of cyber-physical systems considered 
"critical infrastructures." According to the HSPD-7 (Homeland Security Presidential Directive Seven) 
[20], the prioritized vital resources that must be protected from terrorist attacks include electric energy, 
nuclear energy, chemical, agricultural and pharmaceutical manufacturing, among others [21;20]. 
Regardless of the application, physical equipment controlled in an industrial network usually implies risks 
for assets and people's lives involved in the production processes. Therefore, this study considers "critical 
infrastructures" those that can affect the production process causing financial losses, company reputation, 
or endanger human lives, independent of the company segment. 
When industrial protocols were first conceived, the goal was to provide good performance, 
emphasizing providing features that would ensure that task constraints over the network would be met; 
network security was hardly a concern. Over the years, the automation industry has moved away from 
proprietary standards for communication protocols towards open international standards (TCP/IP). 
However, in reality, both coexist [22]. That is why a robust integration strategy to avoid compromising 
the cyber-security aspects becomes a must. 
In the past, OT networks were not connected to the enterprise or public networks like the Internet. 
Today, however, the need to make fast and cost-effective decisions makes up for the necessity of 
accurate and up-to-date information about the plant and the process that demands an increasing 
integration level between different OT systems and between OT and business contexts [22]. Such 
integration transforms the industry and facilitates massive data transformation into accurate, fast, and 
cost-effective information [3]. However, the benefits come with a cost; integrating such different 
contexts increases vulnerabilities, threats, and risks. Vulnerabilities may be caused by logical design 
flaws, implementation errors, or fundamental weakness. In turn, a threat arises when a vulnerability can 
be exploited, inflicting damage to the system [22]. 
The three well-known basic security requirements are availability – the ability to keep the resource 
accessible and available upon demand; integrity – the ability to safeguard the accuracy and completeness 
 
of the resource and confidentiality – guarantee that information is not made available to unauthorized 
individuals. From the CPS point of view, since an unexpected stop in operation may lead to catastrophic 
events, the availability is the most critical security requirement in OT networks. 
  An attacker that successfully exploits vulnerabilities in a CPS might gain access to and, ultimately, 
control operations jeopardizing assets and human lives. The entry points and attack vectors in an 
industrial system are different from enterprise-networks. Sometimes even well-established techniques to 
search for vulnerabilities, such as scanning, have to be avoided in OT networks because of the impact that 
such techniques may bring the operation. 
Typical data flow and information exchange within OT and IT networks integration create connections 
that can be vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The vulnerabilities include, for example, hacking into a network's 
asset or server and compromising information; or physical intrusion into a company to gain access to the 
information or control in the manufacturing processes [10]. Table 1 shows typical attacks and threats on 
cyber-physical systems [4]. 
Table 1 
Attacks and threats to cyber-physical systems 
Point of attack Damage Typical attacks 
Communication Remote spying, data; theft of information; eavesdropping; 
interception of compromising interference signals; software 
malfunction. 
Packet replaying; package spoofing; 
selective forwarding; Sybil attack. 
Actuation Loss of power supply; tampering with hardware; remote spying; 
interception of compromising interference signals. 
Finite energy attacks; bounded 
attacks. 
Computing Illegal processing of data; error in use, equipment failure; 
corruption of data; software malfunction. 
Worm; trojan, virus 
Sensing Tampering with hardware; loss of power supply; environment 
threats; equipment failures; equipment malfunction; disturbance 
due to radiation. 
GPS spoofing; injection of false 
radar signals; dazzling cameras with 
light. 
Feedback Control disruption; feedback integrity attack. Feedback integrity attacks. 
 
The consequences vary widely between different levels of the network and across different points in a 
supply chain. A cyber-attack can cause, for instance, the loss of integrity by hacking into and altering 
measurement systems, unavailability in the form of power disruption, unauthorized access to critical 
information for theft of critical proprietary data or knowhow, unauthorized remote control in industrial 
equipment, or disruptions to production [10]. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL CYBER-SECURITY REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS 
 
Several cybersecurity standards and regulations are imposed by governments and organizations, 
which provide best practices recommendations, sometimes enforcing penalties and fines [21]. This study 
covers the major standards and regulations that apply to OT networks [23], [21]. The following topics 
encompass parts of these documentations related to network and services security (the focus of this 
research). 
 
• NCSC CAF (National Cyber Security Center - Cyber Security Framework): guidance for 
organizations responsible for vitally services and activities.  CAF is a framework with three 
objectives and 14 sub-objectives and principles that helps to avoid cyber incidents. It encompasses 
managing network risks in the supply chain, asset and risk management, resilient networks and 
systems, security monitoring, and detecting security event discovery [24].  
• NIST SP 800-82 (National Institute of Standards and Technology – Special Publication): 
Encompasses common system topologies, re-targets management, operational, and technical 
security controls [25]. 
• NISCC Firewall Deployment Guide (National Infrastructure Security co-ordination center): 
Guidelines for firewall configuration and deployment in industrial environments [26]. 
 
• AGA-12 (America Gas Association): Address retrofitting serial communication and 
encapsulation/encryption of serial communication channels [27].  
• API-1164 Security Standard (American Petroleum Institute): Guidelines physical security, data 
flow, and network design [28]. 
• ISO/IEC 27002:2005 (International Standards Organizations):  provide less guidance for 
industrial networks, but it is useful because it maps other security standards. Include asset and 
configuration management controls and segregation and security controls for network 
communications [29]. 
• NERC CIP (North American Electric Reliability Corporations – Critical Infrastructure 
Protection): Consists of nine separate configuration management controls: security management 
controls, cyber asset identification, electronic security perimeters, and physical security [30].  
• CFATS (Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards): Outline controls for security policies, 
access control, personnel security, awareness, and training [31].  
• NRC Regulation 5.71 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission): provides general security requirements 
of cybersecurity, including a five-zone separation model with one-way communication between 
zones [32]. 
• ISA 99 / IEC 62443 (International Society of Automation / International Electrotechnical 
Commission): Composed two technical reports on control system security. It focuses on security 
technologies for manufacturing and control systems and addresses the integration security in 
industrial environments, including requirements, policies, procedures, and best practices [33]. 
 
Several international security regulations apply to industrial networks; some are global, some are 
regional, and some are applicable in all industrial networks, while others only fit specific industrial 
segment. These cyber-security measures are different but often overlaps security recommendations [21]. 
 
V. CYBER-SECURITY STRATEGY  
 
The cyber-security strategy proposed in this work and described in detail in the following sections was 
mapped according to the most relevant security and compliance requirements extracted from international 
cybersecurity regulations and standards listed in section IV. These requirements were compiled in three 
groups [21]: Perimeter and Security Controls; Host Security Controls and Security Monitoring Controls, 
as shown in Table 2 
 
Table 2 




Description Regulation / Standard 





Construct perimeter at edges using 
multiple layered defenses. 
NIST; ISO/IEC 27002:2005; NRC 
RG 5.71; CFATS; NERC; API-
1164; NCSC CAF; ISA 99 / IEC 
62443 
1.2 Network and 
Perimeter Monitoring 
Implement access policies at the 
perimeter. 
CFATS; NERC; NCSC CAF 
1.3 Network Access 
and Authentication 
Implement network access control, 
central authentication system, directory 
system, or identity access management 
(IAM). 
ISO/IEC 27002:2005; NRC RG 
5.71; CFATS; NERC;  
1.4 Network 
Perimeter Ports and 
Services 
Include mechanisms to prevent protocols 
from initiating commands across the 
perimeter. 





Description Regulation / Standard 




Implement configuration management 
and change control. 
NIST; ISO/IEC 27002:2005; NRC 
RG 5.71; CFATS; NERC 
2.2 Ports and 
Services 
Unnecessary ports and services should be 
disabled. 
NRC RG 5.71; NERC; NISCC 
2.3 Anti-Malware Use of anti-virus systems to detect and 
repair. 
NIST; ISO/IEC 27002:2005; NRC 
RG 5.71; CFATS; NERC 
2.4 Authentication Implement a centralized authentication 
system. 
NIST; ISO/IEC 27002:2005; NRC 






To identify, control, and document all 
entity or vendor-related changes to 
hardware and software.  
ISO/IEC 27002:2005; NRC RG 
5.71; CFATS; NERC; NCSC CAF 
3.2 Documentation Documentation of assets (assets may be 
detectable or discoverable using SNMP) 
ISO/IEC 27002:2005; NRC RG 
5.71; CFATS; NERC 
3.3 Monitoring Generate alerts from unallowed traffic at 
the perimeter. 
ISO/IEC 27002:2005; NRC RG 
5.71; CFATS; NERC; NCSC CAF 
3.4 Authentication Implement user account and 
authentication activity log. 
NERC. 
Compiled from [21;27;28;29;30;31;32;33] 
 
A. Perimeter and Security Controls 
 
Electronic Security Perimeter (1.1) 
 
Construct perimeters and multilayered defenses in a dispersed supply chain requires a specific 
segregation model. The network segregation may be done using firewalls and DMZs.  
To meet the electronic security perimeter requirements and reduce costs with multiples infrastructures 
services simultaneously, the diverse regions where a company has operations and facilities should 
implement a regional DMZ that may offer services to local networks that support its business capabilities. 
One Central DMZ should be implemented to host services that may be offered in a centralized way, as 
given in Figure 3. 
 
 




The segregation strategy is first by geographically, second by business capability, creating a 
hierarchical structure centered on a single Central DMZ. This segregation model's main objective is to 
reduce the number of services infrastructures by offering them as centralized as possible. The option to be 
centralized or not depends on the service's data flow rules and latency requirements. 
The strategy behind centralization is to reduce the need to create local infrastructures. Services can be 
offered centrally, lower the need for local infrastructures, and lower the cost of implementing and 
maintaining these services. In dispersed supply chain companies, this strategy may be very advantageous. 
The communication may be done between OT's networks and the Regional DMZs and between 
Regional DMZs and Central DMZ. Direct communication between two OTs or two Regional DMZs 
(general horizontal communication) is not allowed (this need is unusual), but it may be implemented 
using Regional DMZ or Central DMZ as an intermediary. 
Figure 4 details the network segregation and data flow strategy. Bidirectional (inbound and outbound) 
data flow is allowed only in the adjacent enclave. Only outbound data flow is allowed in the enclave, not 
adjacent (outbound from more secure enclave) limited to one jump. For example, Layer 1, in industrial 
networks, may only communicate with Layer 3 with outbound traffic, Layer 2 may communicate with 
Regional DMZ only with outbound traffic, and communication between Layer 1 and Regional DMZ is 
not allowed. 
IIoT enclaves may be created to support smart devices and sensors that do not belong to the OT 
infrastructures (e.g., environmental sensors).  
In some situations, Regional DMZs can be used as Regional IIoT DMZs when smart devices are 
located near them. However, the data must flow to the IT network through the Central DMZ and not 
Central IIoT DMZ in this context.  
The Internet DMZ is the only way out to the Internet through the IT Network; in some cases, it is 
possible to connect the Central IIoT DMZ direct to the Internet DMZ, for example, when using smart 
sensors in public network infrastructures (4G, 5G, etc.). However, the use of private APNs (Access Point 
Name) should be privileged. This strategy allows the data flow from any CPS (IIoT or OT) to the IT 
network, and all data may be centralized in a data hub or data lake, compromising cybersecurity aspects 
as little as possible. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Services and data flow strategy 
  
Network and Perimeter Monitoring (1.2) 
 
In order to meet requirement 1.3, all inbound network traffic should be monitored by an IPS (Intrusion 
Prevent System) or IDS (Intrusion Detection System) depending on the feasibility. OT networks are 
sensitive to traditional scanning technics and an IPS, for example, uses intrusive scans that may cause 
unavailability to the production processes. In general, IPS should be used to monitor traffic near to the IT 
network (layer 4) and IDS in low-level industrial networks (layers 1,2, and 3). 
 
Network Access and Authentication (1.3) 
 
The Central DMZ should host a centralized IAM (Identity Access Management) or directory services 
that may have regional DMZs if necessary.  Single sign-on in OT services from IT Zones or in IT 
services from OT zones is not allowed, and it is necessary for the implementation of distinct multi-factor 
authentication (MFA). 
 
Network Perimeter Ports and Services (1.4) 
 
Unnecessary perimeters (among DMZs) port and services should be disabled. Only necessary traffic 
between networks must be allowed.   
 
B. Host Security Controls 
Asset Configuration (2.1) 
 
A configuration management system should control asset configuration and changes.  The 
requirement (2.1) may be made possible through a configuration management software known as 
CMDB (Configuration Management Database). CMDB is a database that contains all relevant 
information about the hardware and software components used in a specific perimeter. This service may 
be hosted at Central DMZ and support all OT network layers.  CMDB may compare security 
configurations against authorized configuration files and monitor changes. To manage changes in low-
level assets (Layers 1 and 2), it is suggested to implement backup and versioning (V&B) tools that 
integrate with equipment such as PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers) and HMIs (Human-Machine 
Interfaces), for example, and the use of agnostic software tools is recommended. 
Any code changes must be previously authorized by an approval flow, implemented through a change 
management tool. This condition can be audited via the V&B tool. 
OT patch management should be performed separated from IT patch distribution systems due to the 
critical differences between IT and OT environments. OT systems have different life-cycles, and 
generally, they do not homologate patches in the same velocity that IT systems. It is important to obtain 
risk-free patches so that adequate testing and verification of them should be performed before 
implementation. 
Ports and Services (2.2) 
 
Unnecessary host ports and services should be disabled, maintaining only the ports and services 




An anti-virus system should be implemented for malicious code prevention. The placement strategy 
of anti-virus services depends on the data flow needs. They can be hosted in a centralized way only if it 
does not disregard the inbound/outbound traffic rules. It is necessary to ensure that the anti-virus 
software is up to date and uses the most current malware detection signatures. An important point of 
attention is that equipment and devices that support the industrial system sometimes are sensitive to anti-
virus software, which may require testing and verification performed before implementation.  
 Authentication (2.4) 
 
The centralized direct services or IAM (already discussed in sections 1.3) cover requirement 2.4- 
Implement a centralized authentication system. 
 
C. Security Monitoring Controls 
Asset Configuration and documentation (3.1 and 3.2) 
 
The CMDB tool may meet the requirement 3.1 and 3.2 (as discussed at requirement 2.1). All changes 
in OT assets are monitored and controlled in real-time through SNMP (Simple Network Management 





Monitoring tools should be implemented to generate alerts that typically involve traffic at the 
perimeter (denied or not). Most of the perimeter devices (Firewall, IPS, IDS) can be part of the 
monitoring process, but specific monitoring software may be used. 
The user account and authentication activity log should be implemented in IAM or directory service 
infrastructure (req. 2.4). 
Table 3 consolidates all services that should be implemented to meet all requirements described in 




Group Security Requirement Service / Strategy 
1. Perimeter and Security 
Controls 
1.1 Electronic Security Perimeter DMZ strategy 
1.2 Network and Perimeter Monitoring IDS, IPS 
1.3 Network Access and Authentication IAM, Directory services, MFA 
1.4 Network Perimeter Ports and 
Services 
DMZ strategy 
2. Host Security Controls 
2.1 Asset Configuration CMDB, Patch management 
2.2 Ports and Services DMZ 
2.3 Anti-Malware Anti-virus 
2.4 Authentication IAM, Directory services, MFA 
3. Security Monitoring Controls 
3.1 Asset Configuration CMDB, V&B, and change management 
tools 
3.2 Documentation CMDB 
3.3 Monitoring V&B, Monitoring software, firewall, IDS, 
IPS 




This paper aimed to define an appropriate strategy to manage security risks in companies with 
dispersed supply chains. Dispersed supply chains imply facilities and chains of production strategically 
located in several regions scattered across the world. These dispersed facilities may deliver many 
business capabilities that generate local OT and IT infrastructures.  
Creating local infrastructures for all listed services may be unfeasible depending on the business' size, 
diversity, and dispersion. The greater the number of local infrastructures, the greater the need for 
integration, and the higher the cost of implementation. Additionally, it may increase the security 
vulnerabilities that need to be addressed.  
The cost-effective network services segregation strategy proposed in this paper tries to centralize as 
many services as possible to ensure that all international standards and regulations requirements are 
covered and simultaneously reduce the implementations and maintenance costs, compromising cyber-
security aspects as little as possible. Therefore, creating an integrated network, which, in turn, provides a 
holistic system for monitoring and controlling the physical world through the collection, processing, and 
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